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INTRODUCING COMPETITION TO THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The air transport industry relies upon international coordination
more than any other international transportation service.1 The coor-
dination of regulations and procedures between countries all over the
world makes it possible for vacationers and businessmen to take ad-
vantage of the swiftest means of travel. However, every passenger
must weigh the advantages of speed against concerns about cost. Air
travel is expensive.2
The cost of air travel is a major concern for people living within
the European Economic Community (EEC), or, as it is also called,
the Common Market.3 European travelers are subjected to airfares
which are extremely high, especially when compared to fares paid by
United States travelers.4 Although Europeans have been com-
plaining about airfares for years, the recent United States deregula-
tion policy5 has generated considerable support for the development
of a similar policy for the EEC.6
Extensive regulation of the EEC airline industry has produced
many anti-competitive features. First, most EEC countries have a
national airline company which occupies either a dominant or mo-
1. 1980-1981 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 469) 15 (1980).
2. According to figures published by the International Civil Aviation Organization, Eu-
rope has the highest revenue/cost ratio of twelve regions investigated throughout the world.
(Revenue Cost ratio = Total revenue/total costs x 100). COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, No. 398 (FINAL), SCHEDULED PASSENGER AIR FARES IN THE EEC 13 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT 1981].
3. EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION SERIES, STEPS TO EUROPEAN UNITY 15 (May 1983)
[hereinafter cited as EUROPEAN UNITY].
4. In the United States, where the airlines have been deregulated, average airfares (per
mile) are 35% below European fares. How To Cut Europe's Air Fares, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4,
1982, at 49 (hereinafter cited as Europe's Air Fares].
5. Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980). See also Dagtoglou, Air Transport and the
European Community, 6 EUR. L. REv. 335, 338 (1981). The deregulated airline industry in the
United States "has made U.S. skies the most competitive in the world and turned the once
orderly American airline industry into a survival of the fittest battleground." Greenwald, Bat-
tling It Out In The Skies, TIME, Oct. 8, 1984, at 56.
6. See Unsworth, Can Aviation Decontrol Work in Europe, J. COM., Dec. 8, 1982.
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nopolistic market position within that country.7 Such national air-
lines are generally either wholly or substantially government owned
and controlled.' Second, individual EEC governments, which create
and coordinate international regulations for their airlines, curtail
competition by establishing fare fixing procedures and severely limit-
ing market access to privately owned airline companies.' Finally,
competition is restricted by both government subsidization of unprof-
itable nationally owned airlines and unprofitable routes.10 Conse-
quently, the competitve market forces of supply and demand are
disrupted, which in turn leads to high airfares.11
The growing need to formulate a common air transport policy
for the EEC airline industry has been the subject of considerable dis-
cussion for the past decade.' 2 It has been proposed that deregulating
the EEC airline industry, using the United States deregulation as a
model, will overcome its inefficiencies.' 3 The focus of the deregula-
tion issue revolves around the Treaty of Rome14 and the competition
laws contained therein.' 5 If these laws are applied and enforced, the










BULL. EUR. COMM. SupP. 35 (May 1979).
8. Id.
9. Tyrell, Evolution or Revolution-A Review of Progress on the Abolition of Restrictions in
the Air Transport Sector, 2 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REv. [ECLR] 91, 92-93 (1981).
10. Id.
11. For an overview of how regulation defeats the competitive forces of the market, see
Council of Economic Advisers, Regulation of Monopoly and Competition, in
MICROECONOMICS, SELECTED READINGS 256-62 (E. Mansfield 3rd ed. 1979).
12. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 335.
13. Opening Europe's Skies, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1981, at 12.
14. The Treaty of Rome binds the ten Member States together. Treaty Establishing The
European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 3.
15. Articles 85 and 86 are the definitive competition laws contained in the Treaty of
Rome. Article 85(1) reads in pertinent part:
"The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
Common Market .. "
Article 86 reads in pertinent part: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant postion within the common market or in a subtantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States."
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airlines would have to be deregulated. Deregulation would reintro-
duce competition into the entire EEC airline industry and lead to
lower prices. 16 However, the prospect of applying the competition
laws to the EEC's airline industry raises two important issues. First,
it is necessary to determine exactly how the competition laws should
be applied and enforced. Second, deregulation must be implemented
in a way which will not severely disrupt existing airline services.
This Comment will analyze the international legal issues raised
by the prospect of applying the competition laws of the Treaty of
Rome to the EEC airline industry. First, the administrative frame-
work within which EEC law is applied will be described. 7 Second,
the effects of EEC law on the present airline industry will be ex-
amined. This discussion will explain the difficulty of introducing
competition into the EEC."8 The effects of the competition laws on
EEC airlines within the world aviation community will then be inves-
tigated. 19 Penultimately, a combined factual and legal analysis of the
arguments in favor of and opposed to deregulation will be dis-
cussed.20 Finally, a proposal is made which suggests one method of
incorporating free competition into the EEC air transport industry,
thus promoting a common air transport policy. 21
I. THE CREATION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE EEC
Before examining the role competition may occupy in the future
of the EEC's airline industry, it is necessary to understand this inter-
national organization and how it functions. In this way it may be
demonstrated that the purpose behind the EEC's creation actually
supports a deregulation policy. On the other hand, an overview of
the interaction between the EEC governing bodies will demonstrate
the procedural difficulty of implementing such a policy. These insti-
tutions will be responsible for examining the treaty and the air trans-
port environment. Most importantly, these bodies will determine
how the competition laws should be applied to the industry in light of
the purposes and goals of the Common Market.
Id.
16. Note that within the EEC, the adoption of a regulation which will describe how the
competition laws are to be applied and enforced is necessary in order to deregulate existing
anti-competitive regulations in the airline industry. See infra text accompanying note 34.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 22-55.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 56-92.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 93-157.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 158-201.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 202-64.
Vol. 15
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A. The Four Governing Institutions of the EEC
The EEC was created in an effort to promote harmony in a rela-
tively small geographic area where a great deal of economic interac-
tion existed without coordination.22 As a result of the desire of
certain European countries to mutually promote their economies, the
Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1957.23 Member States who have
signed the Treaty of Rome are bound by its laws and regulations.24
Today there are ten EEC Member States.25 The general objectives of
the EEC are described in Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common
market and progressively approximating the economic policies of
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmo-
nious development of economic activities, a continuous and bal-
anced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of
the standard of living and closer relations between the States be-
longing to it.
2 6
Enforcement of the Treaty of Rome is the responsibility of four
EEC governing bodies described in Articles 137-209.27 These gov-
erning bodies are the Council, Commission, Parliament and Court of
Justice.2' Each has powers in either the legislative, administrative
and judicial areas, which enables them to render direct and binding
orders on Member States and their nationals.29
The Council is primarily responsible for carrying out the objec-
tives of the Community.3" It is composed of representatives from the
Member States who must act in accordance with instructions re-
22. Treaty of Rome, [1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 100-01
[hereinafter cited as COMMON MKT. REP.]. To further illustrate the small geographic area of
the EEC, compare the total United States land area of 3,675,547 square miles with the 587,214
square miles of the European Economic Community. The difference in area between the two
regions is particularly significant when comparing the effects of United States airline deregula-
tion to those foreseeable under the proposed deregulation of air transport in the EEC. Id. at
101.
23. Id. 101.
24. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14.
25. The Members of the EEC are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Great Britian, Ireland, Denmark and Greece. COMMON
MKT. REP., supra note 22, 101.46; EUROPEAN UNITY, supra note 3, at 66.
26. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 2.
27. Id. arts. 137-209.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. "In many respects, the EEC Treaty is only a framework, leaving agreement on con-
crete provisions to the future. It was essentially left to the Council to fill in these details."
COMMON MKT. REP., supra note 22, 4402.01.
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ceived from their respective governments."a While individual Mem-
ber States retain control over their individual economic policies,
coordination of these policies is conducted through the Council.32
This coordination function is executed either by way of Council rec-
ommendations, (which are not binding on Member States), or by
Council decisions, directives and regulations (which are binding).3 3
In order to apply the competition laws to the EEC airline indus-
try, it will be necessary for the Council to officially adopt a regulation
which will delineate how the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome
are to be applied.34 The Council, however, does not generally render
official decisions or adopt regulations without either a recommenda-
tion or advisory opinion from the Parliament or the Commission.3"
The Commission plays an important role within the EEC.36
This relatively non-partisan body is composed of thirteen members
who function in close contact with the Council and act independently
of their home country's desires. 37  Generally, the Commission has
the closest contact with Member States because of its duty to oversee
Community development and to ensure that such growth is formu-
lated in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. 38 The
Commission renders recommendations and opinions to the Council
on Community issues which fall within the purview of the Treaty.39
In addition, the Commission has some power to render certain other
authoritative decisions, exclusive of the Council, on matters specifi-
cally designated by the Treaty of Rome."
The EEC Parliament is composed of Members who represent
the citizens of their particular States, as opposed to their govern-




34. Draft Regulation on Air Transport, 2 ECLR 259 (1981); Treaty of Rome, supra note
14, art. 84(2).
35. COMMON MKT. REP., supra note 22, $ 4402.01.
36. Id. 4472.
37. The personal independence of Commission Members is a prerequisite to serving on
this governing body. Commission Members are obligated not to act at the direction of the
government they represent, and Member State governments are likewise obligated not to exert
any influence on Commisssion Members. Id. $ 4482.
38. Id. 4472.
39. Id.
40. For example, Article 189 gives the Commission the power to make regulations and
issue directives in accordance with the other provisions of the Treaty. However, these powers
are somewhat limited because the Treaty confers ultimate power upon the Council. Id.
41. European Parliament Members are named by the respective Parliaments of the Mem-
Vol. 15
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contact with the Council.42 This particular institution occupies the
role of advising upon issues of importance to the development of the
Community.43 Generally, when the Commission renders a recom-
mendation to the Council, the issue or subject matter is then referred
to the Parliament for an additional opinion.' These advisory opin-
ions address areas of either significant political impact or important
legal interpretations for change.45 Thus, while the Council has the
final word on the application of the competition laws to the airline
industry, the Commission and the Parliament must be consulted
before such a major decision is made.
The final governing body of the EEC is the European Court of
Justice. This body is composed of nine judges who render decisions
concerning the application of the Treaty of Rome to Member
States.46 The Treaty defines intra-Community disputes which come
within the jurisdiction of the Court.47 All other disputes remain
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the individual sovereign States.48
Technically, the Court will not participate in the procedural adop-
tion of the competition laws.49 However, the Court has already ren-
dered certain decisions which concern the competition laws. These
decisions have had a substantial impact and will likely influence any
future adoption of competition laws.5° Moreover, in the wake of
both growing support and opposition for the laws, it is highly prob-
able that the Court may be placed in a position whereby it must
render a decision concerning monopolistic conditions in the EEC air-
line industry.5" This probability makes the adoption of a Community
air transport policy and a defined method of applying the competi-
tion laws more imminent.
52
ber States. Parliament Members are not permitted to accept instructions from their govern-
ments or political parties and they are obligated to act for the benefit of the European





46. In general, the function of the Court of Justice is to interpret the law of the Treaty of
Rome and ensure that its provisions are observed. Id. 4600.
47. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, arts. 169-188.
48. COMMON MKT. REP. supra note 22, 4602.
49. The Council, Commission and Parliament are assigned the tasks of procedurally mod-
ifying the Teaty in terms of new regulations, directives and orders. Id. 4300.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 73-82.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 162-81.
52. Id.
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B. The Difficulty of Integration
The fact that the EEC governing bodies are comprised of repre-
sentatives from all the Member States demonstrates the problem of
developing a policy of deregulation for the EEC. Member State rep-
resentatives of the Council are naturally concerned with the viability
of their own country's national airline.53 Consequently, developing
an air transport policy of deregulation must overcome distinct polit-
ical and nationalistic obstacles in addition to being developed in con-
junction with the law of the Treaty of Rome. In order to overcome
these obstacles the underlying purpose of the EEC will need to be
given precedence. The Treaty of Rome calls for efficient economic
integration.5" It is therefore necessary to develop an air transport
policy which will achieve the goal of the EEC by increasing economic
efficiency, discouraging waste and promoting the opportunity to
travel for individuals living within the Community."
II. THE TREATY OF ROME: A SPECIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD
AIR TRANSPORT
The institutional bodies of the EEC have recognized the growing
problems within the air transport sector for many years. 56 In light of
the problems caused by lack of competition in the airline industry, it
is difficult to understand why the competition laws have not yet been
officially enforced.57 The answer lies in the Treaty of Rome itself.
A. The Transport and Competition Articles
One of the goals of the EEC is to promote a harmonious and
economical transport system.5" The Treaty of Rome contains a com-
53. Council Members act at the direction of their governments which partially or wholly
own national airlines. See supra note 7.
54. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 2. See also art. 3, which lists the general activities
of the Community. These general activities include:
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport;
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market it not
distorted;
(g) the application of procedures by which the economic policies of Member States
can be coordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments remedied;
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the
proper functioning of the common market.
Id. art. 3.
55. Tyrell, supra note 9, at 93.
56. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 335.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 158-201.
58. Article 75 of the Treaty of Rome provides in part that the Council shall, in coordina-
tion with the other EEC governing institutions, lay down "common rules applicable to interns-
Vol. 15
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plete title devoted to defining and implementing community trans-
port objectives.59 The title's prominence is explained by the fact that
the draftsmen of the treaty "were aware not only of the integrating
function of transport but also of its special position and its
problems."' Transport occupies such a position because it must be
coordinated through the efforts of ten economically united, but none-
theless independent nation States and their governments.61
One of the major means by which a harmonious and economical
transport system is promoted is through adherence to the competi-
tion laws.62 "The competition laws of the Treaty of Rome are
designed to ensure fair competition in the EEC under uniform condi-
tions."6 On June 30, 1968, eleven years after the Treaty was first
adopted, the Council decided that the competition laws should be
made applicable to transport by rail, road and inland waterway.
6 4
The competition laws, however, have never been made applicable to
air transport because a special attitude was adopted toward air and
sea transport when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957.65
This attitude is specifically found in Article 84(2) of the trans-
port articles. Article 84(2) states that: "The Council may, acting
unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure
appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport. 66
As a result, not only are the competition laws inapplicable to air
transport, but the provisions of the transport articles are likewise
inapplicable.67
The most significant reason why air transport was treated differ-
ently is the air industry's international character.68 Unlike transport
by rail, road and inland waterway, air transport involves coordina-
tion of sovereign rights both within and outside the boundaries of the
tional transport to or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one
or more Member States." Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 75.
59. Id. arts. 74-84
60. See 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 14.
61. The importance of transport in the EEC cannot be understated. It serves a vital inte-
grating function because of its role in transporting persons and goods acrosss national frontiers.
"The national economies can be unified only if there is an efficient system for moving people
and goods." COMMON MKT. REP., supra note 22, 1802.
62. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 14.
63. Id.
64. COMMON MKT. REP., supra note 22, 2401-2634 (Reg. No. 17).
65. Id. 1945.01, 1945.05.
66. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 84.2.
67. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 348.
68. Id. at 352.
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EEC.69 Moreover, when the Treaty was drafted in 1957, many bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements which addressed international air-
line coordination throughout the world already existed.70 In
addition, it was unclear to the founders of the EEC how to design a
Community air transport policy that would benefit the EEC as a
whole, while not interfering with the relations of members with other
non-EEC countries. 71 Thus, the difficult task of developing a coordi-
nated policy for air transport was left to be decided in the future.
The special attitude toward air transport has created problems
for EEC institutional bodies. Both the Commission and the Court of
Justice have been called upon either directly or indirectly to exercise
their authority under the Treaty in connection with air transport is-
sues. 72 Resolving air transport issues becomes exceedingly difficult in
the absence of specific community laws for air transport regulation.
B. The Court of Justice and the Competition Laws
Although there are no regulations by which to enforce the com-
petition laws, the Court of Justice held, in Commission v. French Re-
public, that all other general provisions of the Treaty of Rome apply
to sea and air transport.73 Based upon the holding of this 1974 deci-
sion it is argued that air transport is subject to the comptetition laws
even in the absence of an official Council regulation.74  However,
there has been no definitive ruling to date as to whether this is in fact
true, and it is clearly a debatable issue. Da Costa en Schaake N. V
and others v. Nederlands Belastingadministratie, a 1963 Court of Jus-
tice decision, illustrates this point.75
In Da Costa, the Court held that, "a judgment of the Court is
binding only within the bounds of the action which has led to the
judgment. ' ' 76 This holding suggests that when the issue in a new case
69. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 15.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 98-103.
71. COMMON MKT. REP, supra note 22, 1945.05; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, REPORT ON THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY 51-60, 64-66 (July
1962).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-82, 171-80.
73. "While under Article 84(2), therefore, [sic] sea and air transport, so long as the Coun-
cil has not decided otherwise, are excluded from the rules of Title IV of Part 2 of the Treaty
relating to the common transport policy, they remain, on the same basis as the other modes of
transport, subject to the general rules of the Treaty." Commission v. French Republic, 1974
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 359, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8270.
74. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 349.
75. Da Costa en Schaake N. V. and others v. Nederlands Belastingadministratie, 1963
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is similar to a previously decided issue, but the subject matter, parties
and circumstances are different, the Court is not bound by a prior
judgment. 7 Hence, it is debatable whether the French Republic case
unequivocally established a general rule that the competition laws
apply to air transport. At that time the Court did not consider all the
implications of such a decision, nor did it take into account the spe-
cial attitude adopted toward air transport in 1957.78
The economic and legal ramifications of such a holding would
be considerable. Individual Member States would have to administer
the competition laws in the absence of a Council regulation detailing
specific enforcment procedures.79 Member States would be free to
interpret the competition laws to their individual benefit. As a result,
the laws would not be applied uniformly.80 Moreover, the competi-
tion laws would only be invoked when convenient, and would have
little significant impact in promoting a more competitive EEC airline
industry."' Such inconsistent application of the competition laws is
not compatible with the promotion of an "economic and harmonious
transport system" for the Community as a whole.8 2
Article 84(2) of the Treaty provides that the Council is the only
institution authorized to adopt an official policy for the economic
harmonization of air transport.83 For this reason, it is unlikely that
the Court would render a decision unequivocally stating that the
competition laws apply to air transport. Such a decision would
77. Id.
78. The issue of the 1974 decision is similar to one which might develop if the general
application of the competition laws to the air transport sector was challenged in the European
Court of Justice. That issue is whether all general provisions of the Treaty apply to the air and
sea transport sectors. However, the Court would not necessarily be bound by its 1974 decision
because the subject matter, circumstances and parties to a decision with respect to air transport
are drastically different from those of the prior decision.
The 1974 case dealt with the French Employment Sea Code of December 13, 1926, which
was held to be in contravention of the general rules of the Treaty on Freedom of Movement for
Workers. The court ruled that even though sea transport was undefined by the Transport
Articles, all other general provisions of the Treaty (in this case Article 48-Free Movement of
Workers) applied to air and sea transport. The factual circumstances of the 1974 case which
led to that ruling are entirely different from the factual circumstances utilized in making a
determination of whether competition laws apply to air transport. The 1974 case did not re-
quire the Court to consider or weigh any of the extremely complex legal and economic
problems which would arise if the competition laws were made applicable to air transport. Id.
79. Letter from Knut Hammarskj61d, Office of the Director General, IATA to G. Con-




82. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, arts. 74-84.
83. Id. art. 84(2).
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clearly infringe upon the Council's authority. However, the likeli-
hood that a party will request the Court to hear a case concerning the
monopolistic practices of air transport increases daily.84 The type of
judgment the Court would be inclined to render is unknown. The
Court, however, is not the only EEC governing body which may be
placed in an awkward position as a result of the Counsil's delay. The
Commission also faces potential conflicts of authority in the absence
of a specific ruling on the role of the competition laws.
C. The Commission and the Competition Laws
The EEC Commission has certain investigatory powers to over-
see reported competition infringements even in the absence of the
direct application of the competition laws to air transport.8" These
investigatory powers are explained in Article 89, which provides that
the Commission may investigate cases of suspected infringement on
its own initiative, or upon the request of a Member State. 6 If the
Commission finds an infringement of the laws, Article 89 authorizes
them to propose appropriate remedial measures.8 7 This authority ap-
pears to be one of form, however, because substantively the Commis-
sion is limited in its control over competition infringements for two
reasons. First, the investigatory powers of the Commission are de-
pendent upon the cooperation of Member State governments. Mem-
ber States must not only report suspected infringements of
competition, but must also coordinate their elimination. 8 However,
few complaints have been forthcoming from Member State govern-
ments because it is the governments themselves who have created
national airline monopolies.89 Second, in the event an infringement
was reported and the Commission submitted proposed measures to
eliminate the infringement, there is no mechanism to ensure that the
proposed measures would be enforced. 90
An independent decision by either the Commission or the Court
84. See infra text accompanying notes 163-80.
85. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 89.
86. Id.
87. Article 89, which gives the Commisssion its investigatory powers, is one of the compe-
tition laws of the Treaty of Rome. In utilizing its investigatory powers under this article, the
Commission acts under the authority of the 1974 European Court of Justice's decision which
states that all general provisions of the Treaty of Rome apply to air transport. Treaty of Rome,
supra note 14, art. 89; Commission v. French Republic, 1974 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 359.
88. "This dependence is detrimental to the effective and consistent operation of competi-
tion policy in this sector of the economy." 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-286) 7 (1982).
89. Id.
90. 1979-1980 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-724) 17 (1980).
Vol. 15
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of Justice with regard to the application of the competition laws
would not achieve the community goal of adopting a common air
transport policy.9 Such haphazard decision making would under-
mine the special attitude adopted toward EEC air transport. This
attitude was adopted precisely because it is so complex in terms of its
international character. 92 Thus, any application of the competition
laws requires meticulously planned coordination through the efforts
of all EEC governing bodies. However, continued delay in adopting
a policy for air transport has compounded the problem of unraveling
its international character.
III. AIRLINE COMPLEXITY AND THE TREATY OF ROME
The existing airline system within the EEC is extremely com-
plex. 93 Several bilateral agreements between Member States which
address considerations such as landing rights, tariffs and flight ar-
rangements in general are primarily responsible for this complexity.
94
Additionally, there are a host of international airline organizations to
which some or all of the Member States belong.95 The purpose of
these organizations is to facilitate cooperation at the government
level between individual States and the various airlines.96 As a result
of the special attitude toward air transport and the delay in formulat-
ing an air transport policy, EEC airline coordination, through bilat-
eral agreements and international airline organizations, has
developed free from the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome.
91. There are two predominant reasons why the goals of the Community cannot be
achieved by an independent institution's application of the competition laws. First, the uncoor-
dinated application of these laws would thrust the entire Community airline system into a state
of uncertainty. Id. at 16. Second, it is the responsibility of the Council to coordinate a compre-
hensive air transport policy in conjunction with the input from the other EEC governing insti-
tutions. See supra text accompanying notes 30-45.
92. 1979-80 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 90, at 16.
93. Id. See also 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 18-19.
94. 1982-83 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 88, at 8.
95. For example, Association for European Airlines (AEA), International Air Carriers
Association (IACA), European Air Carriers Association (EURACA). Of particular impor-
tance is the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). This organization is without regula-
tory power, but plays an important role in the development of air transport in Europe. It
makes recommendations and resolutions, which are addressed to its Members. These are often
implemented by the countries concerned in the same way as regulations because they are
agreed upon by the directors-general of the national civil aviation administrations. BULL. EUR.
COMM. SuPP., supra note 7, at 25, 26.
96. Cooperation in setting regulations at the government level is largely conducted by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the ECAC. Cooperation and coordina-
tion of activities between airlines is largely conducted by the International Air Transport Asso-
ciation (IATA) Id.
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Consequently, an immediate and direct application of the competi-
tion laws would open the door to a host of problems not only within,
but also outside the EEC.97 A review of the role which bilateral
agreements and international organizations play within the EEC will
help demonstrate the extreme difficulty of applying the competition
laws to the air transport sector.
A. The Problem with Bilateral Agreements
Before the signing of the Treaty of Rome, individual European
countries, now members of the EEC, were negotiating air rights.98
These countries originally asserted complete sovereignty over their
national airspace for reasons of security and protection from surface
damage.99 This protectionist attitude influenced the negotiations
during two of the most significant conventions for the regulation of
the airline industry: the Paris Convention of 1919'° and the Chi-
cago Convention of 1944.101 The notion of sovereignty influenced
States' claims to economic control over air transport activities in and
over their national territories. 102 These interests were deemed to in-
clude the interests of a country's own national airline. 13
The bilateral agreements which have evolved over the years be-
tween EEC Member States and other countries establish mutual con-
ditions which must be met before air rights will be exchanged." °
97. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 14-15.
98. For an overview of the beginnning of Nations' negotiations for air rights see generally
Salacuse, The Little Prince and the Businessman: Conflicts and Tensions in Public International
Air Law, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 807 (1980).
99. Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in the International Air Regulation
Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 51, 54 (1982).
100. "The Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S.
173 (Paris Convention). . . was prepared by the Aeronautical Commission of the 1919 Paris
Conference and approved by the Supreme Council of the Conference. The draft was presented
for signature to thirty-two allied and associated states on October 19, 1919. At the outbreak of
the Second World War, thirty-four States had agreed to the Convention." Id. at 54 n.10.
101. "In 1944, the International Civil Aviation Conference (The Chicago Convention) was
held in Chicago upon invitation of the United States Government with the participation of
representatives of 54 States in order to make arrangements for the immediate establishment of
provisional world air routes and services and to set up an interim council to collect, record and
study data concerning international aviation and to make recommendations for its improve-
ment. The participants were to discusss the principles and methods to be followed in the
adoption of a new aviation convention." Id. at 52 n.4.
102. Id. at 54.
103. Id.
104. The Chicago Convention gives the following definitions of the freedoms of the air:
(1) the right to fly across the territory of a foreign country without landing; (2) the
right to land for non-commercial traffic purposes (technical operations relating to the
aircraft, thegzrew, refuelling, etc.) in the territory of a foreign country; (3) the right to
Vol. 15
13
Clifton: Introducing Competition to the European Economic Community Airlin
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
EEC AIRLINE COMPETITION
Important conditions concern agreements which relate to capacity,
market access and revenue sharing. 10 5 For example, a typical capac-
ity sharing agreement fixes the number of seats which can be offered
by two different national airlines on a fifty-fifty basis.106 As a result
of these agreements, the type of aircraft which may be utilized is re-
stricted because only a certain number of seats may be offered.107 In
addition, such agreements place artificial disadvantages on those air-
lines that could otherwise operate more efficiently if they were able to
determine their own capacity levels.108
Bilateral agreements also restrict market access.' °9 Govern-
ments often negotiate to determine which airlines will be granted par-
ticular air rights.1 10 Member State governments naturally favor their
own national airlines and grant the most desirable routes or air rights
to them."' Member States also give special concern to other consid-
erations such as mutual reciprocity and parity when determining
which airlines will be able to operate which routes.' 12 Because mar-
ket access is so strictly regulated by bilateral agreements, competition
and efficiency have been effectively neutralized."13
Bilateral agreements between EEC Member States and con-
an air company to put down, in the territory of a foreign country, passengers, freight
and mail taken in the country of registration; (4) the right to an air company to take
on, in a foreign country, passengers, freight and mail, for off loading in its country of
registration; (5) the right to an air company to undertake the commercial air trans-
port of passengers, freight and mail between two third countries.
Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 336 n.9.
105. Capacity sharing agreements are agreements between airlines which fix the number of
seats aircraft from two different Member States will offer. Revenue sharing agreements are
agreements between airlines which may equalize the revenue between two airlines based upon
the capacity offered. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. 72 (MEMORAN-
DUM No. 2), CIVIL AVIATION: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY
AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 32-33 (1984) [hereinafter cited as EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO].
106. Id.
107. When an airline carrier is only permitted to offer a certain number of seats pursuant to
a capacity sharing agreement, it is thereby also limited in the size aircraft which may be oper-
ated. Id.
108. Id.
109. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 17.
110. For example, Article 6 of the Chicago Convention states: "No scheduled international
air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the
special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of
such permission or authorization." Gertler, supra note 99, at 54 n. 13.
111. The fact that EEC governments bilaterally exchange air rights on an economically
intertwined basis lends itself to possible friction between Member States. The goals of each
sovereign are naturally "[v]iewed from different perspectives and what may be perceived as a
legitimate, economically desirable measure in one country may be considered unfair or discrim-
inatory by another county." Id. at 82.
112. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 17.
113. Id.
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tracting third parties have developed a "customary law" which fur-
ther restricts competition.1 14  At one time Member States were
allowed to exercise discretion in setting the conditions necessary for
foreign carriers which operated in their countries. As a result, even
when airlines failed to comply with certain ownership control condi-
tions they were sometimes allowed to operate." 5 Today, however,
such conditions have risen to the level of binding legal norms, and as
such, customary law." 6
If the competition laws are suddenly applied to the air transport
sector, these bilateral agreements would probably no longer be
valid." 7 Most of the agreements negotiated by the Member States
which contain provisions on capacity and revenue sharing would vio-
late the competition laws."II These violations would extend not only
to agreements between EEC Member States, but also to agreements
with other non-EEC countries." 9 Therefore, the entire EEC airline
industry would be thrust into a state of uncertainty.
120
The negative effect of bilateral agreements on competition, how-
ever, is only one aspect of the problem. International airline organi-
zations have also created various multilateral agreements to which
EEC Member States are signatories. 12 1 Accordingly, Member States
possess certain obligations under these agreements which further
complicate the EEC airline industry and the prospects of directly ap-
plying the competition laws.
B. The International Air Transport Association-Obligations and
Conflicts
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) 2 2 is one
114. Customary international law is created by the habitual or long established practice of
Nation States. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966).
115. Gertler, supra note 99, at 70.
116. Id.
117. 1980-81 EUR. PARL.. Doc., supra note 1, at 18-19.
118. Capacity and revenue sharing agreements would be prohibited by Article 85 in that
they "[h]ave as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market .. " Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 85.
119. Under Article 234, para.2, Member States are obligated to free themselves by any legal
means from all agreements that are not compatible with the Treaty of Rome. If a Member
State is unable to renegotiate such a prior agreement, it must consider denunciation of that
prior agreement. COMMON MKT. REP., supra note 22, 5322.01-.05.
120. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 19.
121. See the treaties discussed in Salacuse, supra note 98.
122. The IATA is an organization of airline companies. At present, IATA's membership
covers over 100 airline companies. "The airlines represent about 80 countries including all
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of the most influential airline organizations in the world.123 One of
the major functions of IATA is the organization of traffic conferences
for coordination of tariffs.124 After these conferences the airlines file
a set of proposed tariffs with their respective governments. 25 Each
government must approve the proposed tariff before it becomes inte-
grated into the system. 126 Recently, the tariff coordinating activities
of IATA have been accused of potentially infringing on the competi-
tion laws of the Treaty of Rome.
127
According to Article 85(1) of the Treaty, arrangements which
"directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions are prohibited."12 However, Article 85(3) provides
an exception for certain agreements which "contribute to improving
the production or distribution of goods. . . while allowing consum-
ers a fair share of the resulting benefit ... ."129 Thus, it is arguable
whether IATA tariff coordination and the participation of individual
airline carriers contravenes Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
The participation of air carriers at tariff conferences neither sets
nor decides rates and fares.a1 3  The air carriers are only instruments
of their governments,13 1 and simply implement the procedures which
are accepted in bilateral agreements between individual States. 3 2 In
this sense air carriers do not "directly" fix purchase or selling prices.
The EEC Commission has indicated that EEC air carriers are n6t
acting in contravention of Article 85 of the Treaty. 133 The Commis-
sion has stated: "[i]nsofar as the airlines tariff practices merely carry
out government instructions, Article 85 and 86 cannot be applied di-
rectly to the airlines."1 34 A strict application of the Treaty, however,
Community Member States excluding Luxembourg." BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP., supra note 7,
at 25.
123. While IATA is purportedly an organization of airline companies, these companies are
actually "[i]nstruments of their Governments in carrying out negotiations mandated by a pro-
cedure agreed in bilateral air agreements between States." Letter from Knut Hammarskjold,
supra note 79, Attachment A, at 7.
124. BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP., supra note 7, at 26.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Letter from Knut Hammarskj6ld, supra note 79, Attachment A, at 6.
128. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 85(1).
129. Id. art. 85(3).
130. Letter from Knut Hammarskj6ld, supra note 79, Attachment A, at 7.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 22, 23 (1981).
134. Id.
16
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indicates that IATA fare fixing does in fact violate Article 85(1).
IATA unequivocably fixes airfares and consequently consumers are
not collecting a fair share of the resulting benefit.135 Likewise, the
adoption of IATA fares does not appear to fall within the exception
of Article 85(3) because airfares remain artificially high.' 36 Addi-
tionally, it is hard to deny that EEC national airlines do not at least
"indirectly" set the price of airfares since they routinely adopt the
prices agreed upon.' 37
The Commission will likely acquiesce to IATA practices be-
cause it is the government participation of Member States which is
actually at issue. 138 In the absence of a definitive ruling on the appli-
cation of the competition laws the Commission cannot effectively
render an opinion on the anti-competitive practices of Member State
governments. 39 Moreover, IATA officials maintain that even if the
competition laws were made applicable to the air industry, IATA
tariff setting procedures would still be exempt under Article 90(2) of
the Treaty of Rome."4 Article 90(2) provides that public undertak-
ings "entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue producing monopoly
shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to
the rules on competition . , However, the Treaty further pro-
vides that the competition laws shall only be enforced upon such un-
dertakings "insofar [sic] as the application of such rules does not
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks
assigned to them."' 42 Therefore, if EEC air carriers qualify as ex-
empt, they could continue to fix airfares through the IATA forum.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26. See also Europe's Air Fares, supra note 4;
Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 337.
136. Europe's Skies, supra note 13, at 12.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
138. Competition in Air Transport, 2 ECLR 159 (1981).
139. Note, however, that the Commission has submitted a draft regulation to the Council
on the application of the competition laws to air transport. Draft Regulation on Air Transport,
supra note 34, at 259. For an analysis of the draft regulation and the power it would confer
upon the Commission, see generally COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. 590
(FINAL), PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EEC) ON TARIFFS FOR SCHEDULED AIR
TRANSPORT BETWEEN MEMBER STATES (1981).
140. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 90(2), provides for an exemption to the general
rule described in Article 90(1). Article 90(1) states: "In the case of public undertakings and
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall
neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty,
in particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94." Id. art. 90(1).
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EEC air carriers may qualify for the Article 90(2) exemption if
they are classified as public undertakings to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights. 14 3 Governments often grant specific
air carriers certain rights and impose certain obligations for the oper-
ation of international air services.'" In addition, air carriers provide
a vital service to tourism, international commerce and the traveling
public in general. 145 From this perspective, EEC airlines may be
classified as "entrusted with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest." Thus, if the EEC administrative bodies wish to al-
low EEC airline affiliation with IATA to continue, the Treaty of
Rome can be read to achieve this result. However, under such an
interpretation, competitive pricing is eliminated.
46
One further consideration should be noted with respect to the
role of IATA in the EEC. Most of the existing bilateral agreements
between Member and non-Member States provide that "airline fares
and rates shall, where possible, be established with account taken of
the recommendations of the International Air Transport Associa-
tion."' 4 7 A fundamental principle of international law is that treaties
or agreements between States are legally binding and States must re-
frain from acts inconsistent with their treaty obligations. 48 "If air-
line negotiations on fares and rates were held to be in violation of the
Rome Treaty the carriers would be unable to continue to consult or
agree on tariffs . . . . Member State governments would be
forced to breach those bilateral agreements which require the airlines
to engage in negotiations prior to any government intervention.' 50
The Treaty, however, provides a possible solution to the problem of
conflict between the competition laws and the IATA forum for nego-
tiation of air tariffs.
Although EEC interests' 5 ' cannot be replaced by national inter-
ests, Article 234 states that existing obligations entered into prior to
143. Weber, Air Transport in the Common Market and the Public Air Transport Enterprises,
5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 283, 290-92 (1980).
144. Airline carriers are permitted to operate only after they have been granted licenses by
their governments. Furthermore, the governments determine which routes each carrier will be
permitted to operate. Letter from Knut Hammarskjald, supra note 79, Attachment A, at 8.
145. Id.
146. The competition laws would not apply to these public undertakings, and governments
could control pricing. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 90.
147. Letter from Knut Hammarskjold, supra note 79, at 9.
148. KELSEN, supra note 114.
149. Letter from Knut Hammarskjbld, supra note 79, at 9.
150. Id.
151. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 16.
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the signing of the Treaty of Rome will only be honored within certain
limits. 152 In the case of IATA, those bilateral agreements which ex-
isted prior to the application of the Treaty's competition laws would
be at issue. EEC governing bodies could feasibly devise a plan
whereby the competition laws could be strictly enforced within the
community and liberally enforced in regard to non-Member
States. 113
The importance of IATA and other international airline organi-
zations which coordinate the relations of States and their airline car-
riers should not be understated. Such organizations and their
functions are deeply rooted in bilateral agreements between countries
all over the world."54 The coordination of air rights between Mem-
ber States is largely dependent upon these organizations. 5 5 It is un-
derstandable why the EEC airline industry would be thrust into a
state of confusion and uncertainty if their activities are held to in-
fringe the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome.
156
If the competition laws are immediately applied to the air trans-
port sector, the applicability of the competition laws will have to be
redefined with regard to Member States and organizations like
IATA. Member governments oppose the immediate application of
the competition laws because they naturally wish to protect their na-
tional airlines-and the rights and privileges that they have obtained
through treaties. 157 Nevertheless, there are strong arguments that
support the immediate implementation of these laws which are
equally well founded.
IV. FREE COMPETITION: SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION
Those who favor a competitive environment believe that compe-
tition should provide the groundwork for a future air transport pol-
icy.15 Those opposed to competition maintain that it simply cannot
152. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 234.
153. "Article 234 does not apply to agreements among the Member States. As between
them, the EEC treaty will take precedence in all cases. In multilateral agreements to which
third countries are parties in addition to one or more of the Member States, the Member States
may in relations with each other invoke provisions of other agreements as against the EEC
Treaty only if more compelling demands are made." COMMON MKT. REP., supra note 22,
5322.01.
154. EUR. COMM. BULL. SUPP., supra note 7, at 24-27.
155. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 15.
156. Id.
157. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 347, 351.
158. Europe's Air Fares, supra note 4.
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work within the EEC, at least not immediately.159 In order to fully
understand the positions of these groups, a factual analysis of the
situation and perspective of both is necessary.
A. Competition Advocates
Competition advocates are largely comprised of airline users and
independent airline carriers who are attempting to enter the mar-
ket."6 For example, airline users often compare European fares to
those charged in the United States and focus attention upon the large
disparity between the two.1 6' Likwise, independent airlines which at-
tempt to offer lower competitive fares are frustrated by overcoming
the obstacles created by excessive regulation. 62 One of the most
highly recognized advocates of free competition who has tried to
enter the European airline market is Sir Freddie Laker.1
63
In 1980 Laker's application for a license from the United King-
dom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was rejected.." The license
would have permitted Laker to operate scheduled low fare services
for more than 640 routes between thirty-five European cities.165 Pur-
suant to the denial of a license, Laker sought review by the High
Court of London, invoking the law of the Treaty of Rome.166 Laker
argued that the Treaty calls for EEC transport competition which
directly includes the air transport sector, 67 and any restrictions ,on
competition imposed by the authorities in the United Kingdom were
superceded by the authority of the Treaty.16 The London Court was
expected to refer the controversy to the Court of Justice, with the
159. Id.
160. Tyrell, supra note 9, at 92.
161. Unsworth, supra note 6.
162. See infra note 170.
163. Weber, Laker Airways vs. The Ten Governments of the EEC-Comments on a Pending
Case, 6 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 257 (1981).
164. Id.
165. Id. Laker wanted to undercut existing IATA fares, and to create a demand large
enough to enable him to operate wide body jets on these routes. "A major reason for the denial
was that most of the routes applied for required fifth freedom rights from foreign govern-
ments .. " Id. at 258. The fifth freedom right allows an air company to undertake the
commercial air transport of passengers, freight and mail between two countries. Dagtoglou,
supra note 5, at 336 n.9. EEC individual governments were unwilling to grant these rights
because of the impact which the "low-fare, high capacity concept would have had on the ex-
isting competitive environmment." Weber, supra note 163, at 258. Moreover, the recognition
of an additional carrier on certain routes was seen as unnecessary because individual govern-
ments felt that adequate services were already provided. Weber, supra note 163, at 258.
166. Weber, supra note 163, at 260.
167. Id. at 258.
168. Id.
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hope that it would render a decision interpreting the Treaty's compe-
tition laws.169 Unfortunately, Laker Airlines collapsed before its
owner was able to bring the case before the Court of Justice. 70
The Court of Justice, however, may still be forced to rule on this
issue. Lord Bethell, a British member of the EEC Parliament, is
making private attempts to pursue a definitive court ruling on the
application of the competition laws to air transport.' 7 ' Bethell has
led a campaign against what he refers to as the EEC airline price
fixing "cartel." 172 He contends that a cartel is being operated by
those aviation companies who are coordinating airfares. 173 In a letter
addressed to the EEC Commission on May 13, 1981, Lord Bethell
complained that the Commission had done nothing to terminate the
situation. 74 On September 10, 1981, he lodged an action against the
Commission in the Court of Justice. 175  Bethell asked the Court to
find that the Commission had failed to put an end to the airlines'
alleged infringements of the competition laws,176 arguing that com-petition between EEC airlines is limited not just by the fixing of fares,
169. Id. at 260.
170. Unsworth, supra note 6. An additional example of the frustration experienced by
independent air carriers is found in the case of Sterling Airways. During 1975 and 1979, Ster-
ling Airways, an independently owned company, registered a number of complaints against the
Scandinavian Airline System (SAS)(a joint operating organization of three airlines: Danish,
Swedish and Norwegian) and the Danish Government. Sterling Airways/SAS, 2 ECLR 10
(1981). Sterling Airways made two allegations. First, the company asserted that as a result of
SAS's monopoly it had been denied entry into the international scheduled flight market in
general, and the Copenhagen/London route in particular. Second, Sterling maintained that the
Danish government had permitted SAS to abuse its dominant position by charging and approv-
ing excessive fares. Pursuant to its limited authority, the Commission conducted an investiga-
tion into these allegations and concluded that in light of fares charged for equal distances
elsewhere, SAS's rates might be a prima facia breach of Article 86 on the basis of excessive
pricing. After the Commission announced its report to the Danish authorities, the fare for the
Copenhagen/London route suddenly dropped. Id.
171. Unsworth, supra note 6.
172. Lord Bethell vs. Commission of the European Communities, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 599 (1982).
173. 1A TA: Air Transport and the Treaty of Rome, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 501 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1A TA: Air Transport].
174. Id. In addition, he also complained that the Commission should take steps to termi-
nate the situation by requesting information and explanations from the aviation companies. Id.
The Director General for competition informed Lord Bethell that in most cases the final fixing
of air fares is the sole responsibility of the State governments. Thus, there was no ground for
scrutinizing the activities of the airline companies under Article 85. Lord Bethell Ys Commis-
sion of the European Communities, supra note 172. Lord Bethell was dissatisfied with the writ-
ten response of the Commission and continued his efforts. Bethell v. Commission, 2 ECLR 267
(1981).
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but also by the allocation of routes.17 7 Furthermore, he accused EEC
governments of refusing independent carriers permission to operate
routes that would inconvenience their own national airlines.' All
of these accusations were well founded.' 79 Unfortunately, Lord
Bethell's action was dismissed on procedural grounds.
80
The lack of competition is creating problems for both airline
users and independent airlines. However, both the EEC Commission
and the Court of Justice have managed to avoid making a definitive
ruling in regard to monopolistic practices.18' Although the instances
of anti-competitive practices would apparently favor the application
of the competiton laws, there are opposing arguments which indicate
the contrary.
B. Competition Opposition
The greatest obstacle to the immediate implementation of the
competition laws is the protectionist attitude firmly rooted in Mem-
ber State relationships with their national airlines.' 82 This obstacle
includes the disrupting effects that are likely to occur to both the
complex network of bilateral agreements 8 3 and the international air-
line organizations. 184 Additionally, it is argued that in a competitive
environment less profitable routes which are currently subsidized by
more profitable ones would be in danger of being closed."8 5 Advo-
cates of this argument focus on the experience of United States
deregulation. 
86
EEC government officials suggest that the United States experi-
ence illustrates how air service patterns can change in the wake of
177. Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1982, at 35, col. 1.
178. Id.
179. Tyrell, supra note 9.
180. The defendants to the action (Air France, Alitalia, British Airways, British Caledo-
nian, Aer Lingus, KLM, Lufthansa, Olympic, SABENA and SAS) claimed that the case was
inadmissible because Lord Bethell could not demonstrate a sufficient personal interest to justify
his case against the Commission.
Private cases in the European court of Justice against EEC institutions are rare, but not
altogether prohibited. In order for Lord Bethell to maintain his action, he will have to prove
that the prior decision of the Commission has had an effect on him. Competition: European
Court Hears Complaint on Air Fares, INTERNAL MKT., Mar. 20, 1982, at 2.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 165-80.
182. Europe's Air Fares, supra note 4, at 50.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 98-121.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 122-57.
185. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 7.
186. For a review of the ramifications of United States deregulation, see generally Green-
wald, supra note 5.
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deregulation.187 United States deregulation has permitted airline
companies to pursue operations on all available routes. t88 This, in
turn, has produced a scramble for routes which entail air travel over
long distances where air carriers perceive an opportunity to earn
greater profits. 189 However, when the large United States airline car-
riers abandoned their shorter routes, new regional carriers filled in
the gaps and began making profits."9 Likewise, free competition in
the EEC is likely to promote the operation of such regional carri-
ers. 191 However, whereas regional carriers in the United States are
experiencing financial success as a result of deregulation, several of
the larger airline companies have experienced substantial financial
losses. Some have gone out of business altogether. 192
IATA has been quoted as stating that deregulation in the United
States has resulted in "uneconomic pricing, fare distortions, subsidy
payments, interruption of services to more than two hundred com-
munities and three disastrous financial years." 193 This is evidenced
by the fact that American operating losses totaled over one billion
dollars from January to June of 1982. The United States Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB) confirmed these and other developing problems
of United States airlines.' 94 EEC Member governments fear that
their national airlines may experience similar operating losses if de-
regulation is imposed.195
Moreover, those opposed to competition maintain that competi-
tion "United States style" simply cannot work within the EEC.' 96
This proposition may be well founded in light of the inherent differ-
ence between the United States and European airline industries. The
United States airline industry deals with basically one country and
187. For an overview of how United States air service patterns have changed in the wake of
deregulation, see generally CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AIRLINE DEREGULATION: A RE-
VIEW AFTER TWO YEARS (1981).
188. Id. at 16.
189. Id.
190. "Since (the United States) Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the
number of interstate airlines has increased from 36 to 125. They range from no-frills dis-
counters like People Express, the fastest-growing company in aviation history, to tiny Regent
Air, which plies its passengers on flights from Los Angeles (California) to Newark (New
Jersey) with caviar, lobster and French champagne." Greenwald, supra note 5, at 56.
191. See infra notes 232-42 and accompanying text.
192. For example, Braniff and Air Florida went bankrupt as a result of attempting to ex-
pand their routes too quickly. Greenwald, supra note 5, at 56.
193. Unsworth, supra note 6.
194. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, supra note 187.
195. Europe's Air Fares, supra note 4, at 50.
196. The Regulated Skies of Europe, EUROPE, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 18.
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one domestic market. 9 " The EEC, on the other hand, is comprised
of ten different domestic markets which work toward the interna-
tional and economic coordination of each country.' 98 Thus, even if
free competition were introduced into the EEC, "it is never going to
be quite as cheap to fly around Europe as it is to fly in the United
States."1 99 This is because European airlines have to bear extra costs.
For example, European landing and navigation charges (either au-
thorized or imposed by governments) are five to ten times higher
than those in the United States. Marketing can cost 150 percent
more because of the complications of dealing in many countries and
with several languages. Night flying restrictions mean that European
aircraft have a working day 24 percent shorter than in United States;
aircraft on the ground earn no money.2° These are only a few of the
differences.2"' Nevertheless, regardless of the state of competition in
the United States, those who support and oppose free competition in
the EEC are still left with the problem of how to solve the EEC air
transport problem.
V. A "PHASED PLAN" FOR COMPETITION
The arguments in favor of applying the competition laws to the
air transport sector are strong.2 °2 Apparently, however, the immedi-
ate introduction of these laws will not solve the problems of the air-
line industry.20 3 Similarly, the EEC immediately needs an air
transport policy in order to help achieve the primary goal of creating
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Europe's Air Fares, supra note 4, at 50.
200. Id.
201. Id. Other differences include the following:
(1) Fuel is up to 50% more expensive because of higher taxes; (2) labor costs are up
to twice as high (although this is partly because the cartel has allowed low-productiv-
ity airlines to survive); (3) military and political restriction make European air routes,
on average, 15% (and in extreme cases 47%) longer than the distance a crow would
fly; (4) operating aircraft over Europe's short distances has the same effect on fuel
efficiency as stopping and starting a car in a traffic jam.
Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 160-81.
203. In addition to those problems already highlighted, the European Parliament has iden-
tified the following ramifications if the competition laws are immediately applied:
(1) any airline would be free to introduce or discontinue any service, at any time and
at any fare, as far as the air sovereignty of the Member States extends; (2) any airline
operator could, by virtue of cost advantages prevailing in his country, oust from a
particular route any other company that did not have these cost advantages; (3) shifts
in employment would occur to the benefit of countries with the lowest cost levels; (4)
less profitable routes would be in danger of being closed and the Community would
thus no longer be able to fulfill its socio-economic responsiblities and obligations.
1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 7.
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a harmonious and economical EEC air transport system. It appears
that application of the competition laws can play an important role in
achieving these desired results. 2" One desirable approach for the in-
tegration of competition into the industry is a "phased plan,"20 5
which entails the slow introduction of competition into the system.
Such a plan gradually provides the groundwork for a more competi-
tive air transport environment which ultimately can be policed by the
competition laws.
A. The "Phased Plan" Approach
Several characteristics of the existing air transport system need
to be changed prior to the implementation of the competition laws.
The changes recommended in the ensuing discussion will require co-
operation from Member State governments in order to alter the anti-
competitive atmosphere which has developed over the past twenty-
five years.20 6 Moreover, to create a more competitive environment
voluntary measures need to be suggested, coordinated and imple-
mented through the combined efforts of EEC administrative bodies
and Member State governments.20 7 This is not an unrealistic expec-
tation since Member State governments are not anxious to deal with
the repercussions of the immediate implementation of the competi-
tion laws. 20 A phased plan would safeguard the viability of nation-
ally owned airlines, and would therefore be more attractive to
Member State governments whose national airlines would otherwise
be placed in financial jeopardy. 2°
Modification of the existing system appears necessary on two
levels. 2 0 First, a more competitive environment needs to be intro-
duced into the air transport sector of the EEC itself. Restructuring
certain aspects of the bilateral agreements between Member States
which relate to air rights can achieve this result.21 Second, EEC
relations with international airline organizations need to be modified
204. 1982-83 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 88.
205. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 19.
206. Cooperation of Member State governments will be necessary and the contents of bilat-
eral agreements which presently neutralize competition will need to be modified. See infra text
accompanying notes 214-41.
207. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at iii.
208. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 354.
209. Europe's Air Fares, supra note 4, at 50.
210. Realistically, the problems of the EEC transport system need to be approached from
several different angles. For a comprehensive approach to the problem, see EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION MEMO, supra note 105.
211. Id. at 32-34.
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in order to coordinate the creation of a more competitive environ-
ment within the EEC, while protecting individual Member States'
interests.212 This particular objective will require greater study of
both existing and desired relations in order to formulate an appropri-
ate policy.213
B. Building Flexibility Into the System
Increasing flexibility within the existing regulatory system
would allow more room for airlines to effectively compete with one
another.2 14 Renegotiating existing bilateral agreements which now
promote the non-competitive status quo is therefore necessary. Opti-
mally, negotiations between Member States would take place on a
multilateral level, which would ensure the harmonious development
of all transport throughout the Community.215 Multilateral negotia-
tions could be achieved by creating an EEC airline organization with
the sole function of coordinating the resolution of air rights between
Member States.216 Under the present system, however, full coopera-
tion on a multilateral level cannot be expected due to the deeply
rooted self interests of the Member States.217 Thus, it is more realis-
tic to consider renegotiation of bilateral agreements as a starting
point.
As previously discussed, bilateral agreements between Member
States establish mutual conditions which must be met before air
rights will be exchanged. 2 8 The two most important conditions in-
volved are agreements concerning capacity and revenue sharing.219
In renegotiating bilateral agreements, conditions which concern ca-
pacity and revenue sharing should be modified. 220 The typical capac-
ity sharing agreement fixes the number of seats which can be offered
by two different airlines on a fifty-fifty basis.221 If Member States
were not permitted to ensure that their national airline is guaranteed
fifty percent of the traffic coming to and going from their country,
more desirable results could be achieved.222 Similarly if no capacity
212. Id. at 50.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 21.
215. 1983-1984 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-386) 3 (1983).
216. Id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
218. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at 32-34.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 30.
221. Id. at 32.
222. Id. at 30.
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or revenue sharing guarantees were permitted, capacity and revenue
would be determined by consumer demand for the most desirable
service available. On the other hand, most Member States would be
unwilling to completely surrender their capacity and revenue guaran-
tees,2 23 as a complete surrender could lead to the premature financial
demise of inefficient airlines.224 In order to survive, some national
airlines would need the opportunity to cure their inefficiencies and
restructure the services they offer.
The renegotiation of capacity and revenue sharing agreements
could involve a downward readjustment of guaranteed shares over a
period of time.225 For example, such readjustment could be imple-
mented by decreasing the guaranteed market share by ten percent
every two years for a total period of ten years.226 Many variations to
such a downward readjustment could be offered in order to accomo-
date the particular needs of individual national airlines. As the guar-
antees of capacity and revenue decrease, it would be necessary for
airlines to readjust to changes in market share.227 Yet, at the same
time, airlines would be given a definite time span within which to
work toward greater efficiency. If operation efficiency cannot be at-
tained, competition would force the airline out of the market.
228
A further consideration in regard to renegotiating bilateral
agreements concerns the problem of limited market access. As previ-
ously noted, market access to independent airlines is severely re-
stricted by governments who favor their national airlines and
accordingly negotiate the best air rights for those airlines. 229 Addi-
tionally, governments are very reluctant to grant operating licenses
to independent airlines. 230  To remedy the limited market access
223. This would open the door to the possibility that one airline could dominate a large
share of the entire EEC airline market, which would be unacceptable to Member States. Id.
224. Europe's Air Fares, supra note 4, at 50.
225. In its 1984 Memorandum to the Council, the Commission recommends that national
airlines should not be guaranteed any more than 25% of the market. EUROPEAN COMMISSION
MEMO, supra note 105, at 30.
226. Id.
227. Eliminating the guarantee of market share held by national airlines would also enable
independent airlines to enter the market and to offer competitive services. This would shift the
airline industry within each Member State from a "monopolistic" one to one of "monopolistic
competition." Those airlines who wish to survive in a state of monopolistic competition will
need to (a) cut costs below those of other airlines and (b) differentiate their services in a way
which will attract consumers. For an overview of these economic principles, see generally
ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS 555-82 (E. Mansfield 2d ed. 1977).
228. Id.
229. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 343.
230. Id. at 337.
Vol. 15
27
Clifton: Introducing Competition to the European Economic Community Airlin
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
EEC AIRLINE COMPETITION
problem Member States should liberalize their policy of granting op-
erating licenses to independent airline operators. 231 However, this
need not be done haphazardly. The influx of independent airlines
could be regulated by establishing certain requirements which must
be complied with before an operating license would be granted.232
For example, a potential new carrier could be required to furnish
profitability plans and designate the resources they have available to
perform their expected operations.233 Moreover, Member State gov-
ernments could place temporary limits on the number of traffic rights
granted to new carriers, which would in turn safeguard their own
national airlines.234 As the forces of competition begin to operate
and certain airlines prove their efficiency, traffic rights could be
granted more liberally. Consumer demand would determine which
airlines survive.
Presently, some rights to operate routes negotiated through bi-
lateral agreements remain unused.235 In general, these rights relate
to less profitable airline routes in thinly populated areas. 236 If gov-
ernments are initially unwilling to grant rights to carriers who want
to pursue more heavily traveled routes, special allowances could be
made for operators who develop the less profitable routes. These less
popular routes could be pursued by independent carriers without
threatening the operations of nationally owned airlines.237 Smaller
air carriers should be permitted to operate the shorter routes without
"detailed justification or the insistence on a reciprocal operation,"
because smaller airlines do not pose a significant threat to the larger
238 thcarriers. Thus, the smaller carriers should be permitted to pursue
the shorter routes if the national airlines opt not to do so.
There is an additional alternative to the above scenario which
promotes the utilization of the low capacity, low-profit, short haul
routes. This alternative involves abandoning all restrictions239 on
aircraft operating with a seat capacity of twenty-five or less.2 ' Low
capacity air carriers do not exert a significant impact on the existing
231. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at 43.
232. 1979-80 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 90, at 13.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at 43.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 44.
239. However, restrictions in regard to the maintenance of safety should clearly not be
abandoned.
240. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at 44.
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system, yet have excellent potential for development. 24' By aban-
doning restrictions on smaller carriers, services on low profit routes
would be stimulated, thus creating a wider variety of services to Eu-
ropean travelers.
C Modification of State Aids
Relaxing the regulatory system structured by bilateral agree-
ments will also increase competition. However, such increased com-
petition will be short lived if State aids24 2 are not adequately
restricted. Otherwise, increases in competition might lead to a subsi-
dies race and financing competition.
243
The Commission has certain investigatory and proposal rights
with regards to State subsidies. 2" Article 93(1) provides that the
Commission, in conjunction with the proper authorities of the Mem-
ber States, shall review all granted State aid on a regular basis. More
specifically, Article 93(1) states that if the Commission finds that the
subsidies offered are contrary to the promotion of competition, it
shall propose appropriate remedial measures to the Member State
granting aid. The purpose of such a measure is to ensure the progres-
sive development of the common market.245
Presently, Member States grant monies to their airlines as they
see fit. In order to introduce competition into the airline industry,
Member States must give special attention to their obligation under
Article 92 to grant only realistic State aids.246 Ideally, Member
States should be required to notify the Commission in advance of
proposed State subsidies to airlines.247 In this way the Commission
241. Id.
242. Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome suggests permissible and impermissible state aids,
but does not specifically define them. "[H]owever, the wording of the article indicates that,
generally, every type of allowance given by the State, directly or indirectly, to individual enter-
prises or sectors of the economy is included. Thus, the term covers non-repayable money pay-
ments, i.e., true subsidies, as well as interest reductions, payments in kind and any other
benefits .. " COMMON MKT. REP, supra note 22, 2922.10.
243. Government subsidization would eliminate any competition which would otherwise
be integrated into the airline industry. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at 36.
244. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 93(1). These investigatory and proposal rights
may be exercised when the provisions of Article 92(1) are violated. Article 92(1) provides that
"any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring [sic] certain undertakings or the pro-
duction of certain goods shall insofar [sic] as it affects trade between Member States, be incom-
patible with the Common Market." Id. art. 92(1).
245. Id. art 93(1)
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could make an investigation of the proposed aid.24 Member States
would then need to comply with Commission proposals, or at least
make every effort to comply with the recommendations.24 9 Such a
procedure would require the institution of some general guidelines by
the Commission as to what constitutes permissible or impermissible
State aids.25° Over a period of time, State aids to national airlines
could be completely eliminated except in extreme cases.
At the onset of the phased plan the determination of permissible
or undesirable State aid will likely have to be done on an ad hoc
basis.251 The primary inquiry will be whether the proposed aid is
objectively warranted. An example of permissible State aid is the
case where the subsidy is granted in order to promote less profitable
routes to rural regions.252 A more difficult determination involves
the example where State aids are granted in order to revive a failing
airline operator.25 a In this situation there are several factors to weigh.
Consideration must be given to whether the particular operator is
capable of revival.25 4 If the operator is merely experiencing a tempo-
rary downswing, temporary aid may be in order. On the other hand,
if the operator is at the end of its growth cycle, aid should not be
permitted.255 An additonal consideration is whether one airline
should be subsidized at the expense of another. This could promote a
subsidies race which should be avoided.256
D. International Integration
Each of the preceeding recommendations can be implemented
within the international boundaries of the EEC. Once these measures
are implemented the competition laws can be directly applied to the
air transport sector within the ECC. In the meantime, however, the
relationship of EEC Member States to various international organi-
zations will need to be studied extensively. 2 "
It is apparent that certain agreements between Member States
and international airline organizations will need to be modified.258
248. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 93(1).
249. Id. at 93(2).
250. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at 37.
251. Id.





257. Id. at 50-51. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01, 122-53.
258. Id.
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For example, the relationship of EEC airlines with IATA must be
redefined.259 The United States experience with IATA and conflict-
ing antitrust considerations should serve as an example to the
EEC.2" At one time, United States airlines rejected the IATA "car-
tel."26 Later, United States airlines found that negotiations between
airlines serve a vital international purpose in the coordination of in-
ternational air carrier services.262
Although it is unclear what the future relationship between the
EEC air transport system and international airline organizations
should be, one general guideline needs to be followed in redefining
this relationship: the interests of the EEC as a whole must be given
precedence over the interests of individual Member States.263 By de-
fining the goals to be achieved for the EEC as a whole, negotiations
with international airline organizations will be more meaningful to
both the Common Market and the international airline community
outside the EEC.2e6
VI. CONCLUSION
The EEC does not have an air transport policy to coordinate
this international segment of its economy. 265 At present, the EEC
airline industry is characterized by monopolies and high airfares.
266
Consequently, very little competition among EEC airlines exists.267
The direct application of the Treaty of Rome's competition laws to
the airline industry will arguably promote competiton, which will
lead to a more cost efficient industry.268
The competition laws of the Treaty of Rome have been indi-
rectly applied to air transport through the authority of the EEC gov-
erning institutions 269 on a very limited basis. The powers of these
institutions to oversee competition infringements have been largely
ineffective, 270 as the Treaty limits their authority in the absence of an
259. See supra text accompanying notes 122-57.
260. For a discussion of U.S.-IATA relations, see generally IATA flies, EUROPE, Mar.-
Apr. 1982, at 12.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 1980-81 EUR. PARL. Doc., supra note 1, at 16.
264. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO, supra note 105, at 51.
265. See supra text accompany notes 58-72.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
267. Id.
268. See supra text accompany notes 160-81.
269. See supra text accompany notes 73-92.
270. See supra text accompany notes 160-81.
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officially adopted air transport policy.27 t
Because there has never been a common air transport policy for
the EEC, the industry has developed at the prerogative of the indi-
vidual sovereigns.272 Protectionist attitudes towards territorial air
space have resulted in permeative regulation.273 Today, these regula-
tions are coordinated through bilateral agreements and the confer-
ence forums of international airline organizations.274 The present
coordination procedures have provided a highly regulated, complex
and expensive airline system.275 Moreover, competition among EEC
airlines has been effectively neutralized.276
The lack of competition in the EEC airline industry has
prompted considerable debate over the last decade.277 This debate
concerns whether or not free competition should be the focal point of
a common air transport policy for the EEC. An analysis of the argu-
ments in favor of introducing free competition reveals the many defi-
ciencies of the existing industry.278 On the other hand, the
arguments opposed to free competition demonstrate that the immedi-
ate introduction of such a policy would upset the equilibrium of the
present system, which would have a disrupting effect on the range of
air travel services offered in the Community.2 79 The optimal way to
attack the problems of the EEC airline industry is with a "phased
plan" for free competition, which would introduce competitive meas-
ures gradually.28°
If the EEC airline industry is permitted to operate as it presently
does, the purpose behind the Community's creation will be ig-
nored.281 The Treaty of Rome mandates the economic integration of
transport and the promotion of the social well being of all people
living in the Community.282 Free competition will benefit both Euro-
pean travelers and promote the economic integration of the airline
industry. If prompt action is not taken to remedy the inadequacies of
271. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 84(2).





277. Dagtoglou, supra note 5, at 335.
278. See supra text accompany notes 160-81.
279. See supra text accompany notes 182-201.
280. See supra text accompany notes 202-64.
281. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, arts. 2, 3.
282. Id.
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the present system, the EEC airline industry will continue to stagnate
in its maze of excessive regulation.
Leah Elizabeth Clifton
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